Transnational Coordination Failures in Intertemporal Counterterrorism Games

posted Nov 21, 2013, 6:40 PM by Adriana M   [ updated Nov 21, 2013, 6:42 PM ]
ABSTRACT: This paper fills an important gap in the literature. It is the first systematic effort ofaddressing counterterrorism policy coordination failures due to transnationalintertemporal externalities. As these externalities involve both spatial and timedimensions, non-cooperative policy coordination failures are better captured in aframework that allows us to consider two types of non-cooperative dynamic games, onein which national authorities are myopic and another in which they are farsighted. Weshow that the steady state outcomes for both types of non-cooperative games arecharacterized by larger counterterrorism expenditures than their counterparts in the socialoptimum. The farsighted equilibrium always yields greater levels of counterterrorismexpenditures, terrorist activities and violence than those produced by the myopicequilibrium. Thus, the distortion produced by the farsighted equilibrium is greater thanthe distortion produced by the myopic equilibrium 

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